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Formalist Textualism and the
Cernauskas Problem

LARRY ALEXANDER*

In a recent article, Tara Grove distinguishes between what she calls
“formalist textualism” and “flexible textualism.”1 Formalist textualism is
really another term for literalism, in which statutory and constitutional
language is given its semantic meaning—presumably its meaning at the
time of enactment 2—in its “semantic context.” 3 Grove illustrates the
latter by pointing out that the phrase “domestic violence” appears in a
statute that also mentions “insurrection,” thus suggesting that domestic
violence there refers to acts similar to insurrection rather than to spousal
abuse.4
Flexible textualism, on the other hand, looks beyond the semantic
meaning of the text and its semantic context to the text’s purpose and the
assumptions and understandings of the enactors and the public at the time
of enactment.5 To put it in terms I prefer, flexible textualists want to know
what the text—or more precisely, the legislature whose text it is—is
asserting. And what the text is asserting may be different from its semantic
meaning.
Grove illustrates the distinction between formalist and flexible textualism
by reference to the opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia.6 The
*
© 2021 Larry Alexander. Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San
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1. Tara Leigh Grove, Which Textualism?, 134 HARV. L. REV. 265 (2020).
2. Id. at 305.
3. Id. at 266.
4. Id. at 290.
5. Id. at 306.
6. 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
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question there was whether firing someone for engaging in homosexual
acts counted as sex discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act, which proscribes “discrimination . . . because of such individual’s . . .
sex.”7 The dissenters argued that it did not. They pointed out that no one
in the Congress that enacted Title VII thought that it did, and Congress had
subsequently repeatedly rejected attempts to add protection for homosexuals
to Title VII.8 Thus, it was clear to the dissenters that Congress, through the
language of Title VII, was not asserting that firing someone for engaging
in homosexual acts was what was meant by sex discrimination.
Justice Gorsuch, however, writing for the majority, took a formalist
(literalist) approach to the text. Gorsuch argued that if people are subjected
to different treatment because of their sex, they have suffered sex
discrimination in violation of Title VII.9 And if a male employee is fired
for having sex with men, but a female employee would not be fired for
having sex with men, then the male employee has been fired because he
is male, which is sex discrimination.10
Justice Gorsuch was surely correct as a literal matter. Sanctioning gay
employees or transgender employees does treat them worse than other
employees because of their sex. And to conclude that no more need be
shown to make out a Title VII violation is Grove’s formalist textualism in
action.
Grove’s purpose, however, is not merely to describe and contrast
Gorsuch’s formalist textualism with the dissenters’ flexible textualism.
She has a dog in the fight. She believes courts should follow Gorsuch and
employ formalist textualism. She argues that flexible textualism risks the
Supreme Court’s sociological legitimacy because its very flexibility, as
compared to the more algorithmic literalism of formalist textualism, may
lead the public to believe the Court’s decisions are affected by political
pressures or preferences.11
Groves sees the so-called absurdity doctrine as a tool of the flexible
textualism that she urges the Court to abandon. That doctrine dictates that
when a literal reading of a text produces results so bizarre that one cannot
assume the legislature could have intended them, that literal reading should
be abandoned in favor of a reading that avoids those results. And if the
object of textual interpretation is to discover what the legislature is asserting,
then the absurdity doctrine furthers that object.

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
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42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
See 140 S. Ct. at 1767-78 (Alito, J., dissenting).
140 S. Ct. at 1740 (Gorsuch, J.)
Id. at 1740.
Grove, supra note 1, at 296–99.
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Grove, however, is willing to abandon the absurdity doctrine and other
adjuncts of flexible textualism, even if that means, inter alia, upholding
Carol Bond’s conviction for using a “chemical weapon” when she attempted
to poison her husband’s mistress,12 or reversing the Court’s decision in
King v. Burwell13 that purchase of health insurance through the health
insurance exchanges established by the federal government was entitled
to the same tax credit that the Affordable Care Act made available to
purchases “through an Exchange established by the State.”14
My question is whether Grove or any other advocate of formalist
textualism is willing to go the whole way with it. Grove shows she’s
ready to stomach reversing Bond v. United States and King v. Burwell,
bitter pills though they may be. (I suspect Bostock was not a bitter pill.)
But let me introduce the little case of Cernauskas v. Fletcher.15 Jacob
Cernauskas brought suit against Bishop Albert Fletcher to enjoin him
from closing an alley abutting Fletcher’s property. Fletcher relied on a law
that Cernauskas claimed had been repealed by a recent statue, the
repealing clause of which stated, “All laws and parts of laws . . . are hereby
repealed.” The court stated, undoubtedly correctly, that the legislature
had merely wanted to repeal those laws that conflicted with the statute it
was enacting, and that the necessary part of the repealing clause, “in
conflict herewith,” had been omitted inadvertently. In other words, the
Arkansas court was employing Grove’s flexible textualism.
But consider what result a formalist textualism would produce in
Cernauskas. When the statute in question was enacted, it would thereby
become the only law in the state of Arkansas, all other laws having been
repealed. That’s what the semantics of the repealing clause dictate; and
there is nothing in their “semantic context” that suggests that “all laws . . . are
hereby repealed” doesn’t mean what it says. So until the legislature passes
new laws, Arkansas would not have laws against murder, rape, robbery,
and so on. And anyone who committed those and numerous other crimes in
the period after the repealing clause went into effect would have an ex post
facto law claim against their prosecution.
Now, if one is truly a formalist textualist, reversing Cernauskas is the
really bitter pill one would need to swallow. But I think the Arkansas court

12.
13.
14.
15.

Bond v. United States, 572 U. S. 844 (2014).
135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
See 26 U.S.C. § 36(b)(2)(a).
211 Ark. 678, 201 S.W.2d 999 (1947).
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got it right. Formalist textualism is, I submit, thoroughly wrongheaded.
Ascertaining what legislatures are asserting through their texts can never
be as algorithmic and free of fallible judgment calls as formalist textualism
requires. And if one is tempted, like Grove, by the judgment-free allure of
formalist textualism, just remember Cernauskas. That will make it easier
to resist.
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